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5 Introduction
Understanding the drivers of quality of healthcare costing is essential for decision-making at all 
levels. At the provider level, cost information is used to inform local management decisions. It 
feeds into Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) based payment systems (Tan et al., 2014, 2011) at the 
regional or national level. Furthermore, cost information forms the basis of economic evaluations 
10 at all levels, aiming to make healthcare services more efficient (Chapman, Kern, Laguecir and 
Quentin, 2016). Internationally, comparable cost information is a prerequisite for efficiency 
assessments and benchmarking (Linna et al., 2010; Busse, Schreyögg and Smith, 2008; and 
Schreyögg et al, 2008). However, recent research has pointed out that the quality of healthcare cost 
information is often limited (Hrifach et al., 2018; Chapman, Kern, Laguecir and Quentin, 2016; 
15 Mercier and Naro, 2014; and Chapman and Kern, 2010). In this article we report on a study of 
approaches to clinical costing across seven countries to analyze relationships between different 
dimensions of quality of cost information with divergent regulatory purposes.
The accounting and health policy literature has identified three main dimensions of cost 
information quality. Firstly, the costing accuracy, regarding how cost information reflects actual 
20 consumption (Mercier and Naro, 2014). In practice, costing data are always inaccurate to some 
degree (Labro and Vanhoucke, 2007), as it would be too costly to assign all costs strictly accurately 
to cost objects. In other words, perfect costing is too expensive (Labro and Vanhoucke, 2007). 
Christensen (2010) proposes that managers need to be strategic about deciding where to allow less 
strictly accurate methods so as to focus analytical resources where they might add the most value.
25 Secondly, managerial relevance, depending whether cost information is considered useful for the 
provider level’s management process. The more detailed cost objects are introduced into the cost 

































































analysis, the more useful it appears for managers (Pizzini, 2006). Managerial relevance may even 
lead physicians to change their resource utilization patterns of treating patients (Da Silva Etges et 
al., 2020; Angelé-Halgand and Garrot, 2014; and Eldenburg et al., 2010). In addition, managerial 
30 relevance seems to be associated with hospitals’ profitability. (Pizzini, 2006).
Thirdly, the costing approach in terms of standardization across provider organizations (Busse et 
al., 2013). A lack of standardization of costing practices across provider organizations leads to 
costing variation. Heterogenous definitions of costs, for example, may cause such variations 
(Himmelstein et al., 2014). These variations are problematic (Northcott and Llewellyn, 2004; and 
35 Malcomson, 2007), particularly when cost information is used for tariff setting (e.g., in DRG-based 
payment systems), as the obtained tariff fails to appropriately reimburse hospitals for services 
provided (Tan et al., 2014; and Vogl, 2012). Such variation also makes comparisons of clinical 
procedural costs difficult, even within a country, let alone across countries. 
Increasing cost pressures and demands for transparency in public health expenditure have led to 
40 greater attention to cost information. While cost reporting is subject to regulation in many 
countries, the interaction between such regulation and the use of cost information is a relatively 
new field of research (Labro and Stice-Lawrence, 2020; Eldenburg, Krishnan and Krishnan, 2017; 
Chapman, Kern, Laguecir and Quentin, 2016; and Chapman, Kern, and Laguecir, 2014). 
Accordingly, there is a need to better understand these dimensions of cost information quality at 
45 the provider and national levels in order to manage the quality of cost information (De Araujo et 
al. 2019). Therefore, this paper’s research question is: how can the quality of cost information be 
managed?
In the next section, we review the literature to analyze how quality cost information might be 
conceptualized and achieved. We then report on a study undertaken to analyze clinical costing 
50 approaches in seven countries. We find considerable diversity of approaches. Having set out our 
findings on the nature of this diversity, we then relate these findings to our analysis of the extant 

































































literature to point out the complexity of trade-offs between the quality of cost information, the 
costs of collecting and analyzing it, and the different purposes to which it might contribute. We 
conclude with a proposal for how a two-dimensional Materiality and Quality of Cost Score (2D 
55 MAQS) approach can support both regulators and providers in understanding how and where 
clinical costing might enhance financial and clinical decision making.
Conceptualizing and achieving quality in clinical cost information
This section explores findings from the research literature around the three dimensions of cost 
information quality, i.e., cost accuracy, the costs’ managerial relevance at the provider level, and 
60 standardization across provider organizations. All three dimensions are matters of direct concern 
for regulators in this field and, in analyzing the literature, we examine basic cost analysis approaches 
and how these relate to the three identified dimensions of quality of cost information.
 Accuracy of cost information
Accuracy of costs concerns the accurate allocation of costs at the cost objects’ level and constitutes 
65 a general problem in the management accounting literature (e.g., Labro and Vanhoucke, 2007). 
Depending on the method used for attributing indirect costs to cost objects, the costs recorded at 
the cost object level may vary (Laguecir, Chapman and Kern 2020). 
Tan et al. (2009, 2014) distinguish four methods to allocate costs at the cost object level, i.e., 
bottom-up microcosting, top-down microcosting, bottom-up gross costing, and top-down gross 
70 costing. In contrast, we rely on the distinction between two methods commonly found in the 
management accounting literature, i.e., traditional volume-based costing and activity-based costing 
(Cooper and Kaplan 1998, and Mohr 2017). Bottom-up costing refers to the methodological 
choice to aggregate the cost of the chosen cost object from costs analyzed at a lower level of 
aggregation than the cost object. (Please see the cost vocabulary section for further explanations.) 
75 Top-down costing refers to the methodological choice to disaggregate the cost of the chosen cost 

































































object from costs analyzed at a higher level of aggregation than the cost object. (Again, please see 
the cost vocabulary section for further explanations.) We argue that the distinction between 
bottom-up and top-down costing is independent of the methodological choice of traditional 
volume-based costing and activity-based costing.
80 Traditional costing allocates indirect costs to cost objects based on volume. The cost driver is 
calculated by dividing indirect costs by the allocation base, e.g., direct costs. The advantage of 
traditional volume-based costing is the relatively fast and straightforward calculation of cost drivers 
and, consequently, the allocation of related costs at the level of cost objects. Its disadvantages lie 
in relative inaccuracy, as the method assumes a direct relation between direct and indirect costs, 
85 which is often not the case. This especially occurs when hospital information systems are not 
sufficiently developed to trace all resource consumptions at the patient level, which leads to a 
relatively massive proportion of indirect costs.
Cooper and Kaplan (1998) conceptualized an alternative way of allocating indirect costs to cost 
objects, called activity-based-costing (ABC). Whilst they wrote many individual articles, their most 
90 comprehensive discussion drawing things together on ABC is the book published in 1998. Within 
this approach, cause-and-effect relationships are established between indirect costs and cost 
objects. Indirect costs are attributed to cost objects based on cause-effect relationships and, thus, 
based on costs caused by the cost object. Consequently, costs attributed to ABC at the level of 
cost objects are more accurate than traditional volume-based allocation, where costs are allocated 
95 more randomly based on the assumption that indirect costs increase with the volume of direct 
costs or turnover. This especially applies to organizations with a relatively high share of indirect 
costs and various cost objects, as is the case for a health care provider.
Although scholars praise ABC’s advantages, ABC adoption rate is lower than expected. Analyzing 
the implementation of ABC across hospitals in Ireland, it was found that, of the 20 hospitals that 
100 had responded to a survey of 60 hospitals, only two had implemented ABC across all units, and 

































































55% had implemented it in selected units (Doyle et al. 2008). Similar results were found in a study 
of 52 U.S. providers, where adoption rates had dropped from 16% to 14% within ten years 
(Lawson 2005). This observation of the academic literature praising ABC, on the one hand, and 
on the other hand relatively low adoption rates, has been labeled the ABC paradox (Gosselin 1997). 
105 Some of the explanations advanced for this paradox were, among others, I.T. related issues, lacking 
involvement of operational staff, and problems updating ABC data (Kaplan and Anderson 2003, 
and Lawson 2005). These hindering factors have led to the development of Time-Driven Activity-
Based Costing TDABC (Kaplan and Anderson 2003), which is an allocation method to make the 
bottom-up approach more reliable and easier to implement. Costs are here captured at the 
110 department or unit level and then divided by the number of total minutes corresponding to that 
department’s theoretical capacity. The implementation costs of TDABC are lower than those of 
ABC. 
Kaplan and Porter (2011) argue that the implementation of TDABC could solve the problem of 
healthcare, as cost data are often of poor quality since they are mostly based on traditional volume-
115 based costing. The accuracy of cost data that can be achieved with a TDABC at patient-level results 
in more accurate data at aggregated levels, e.g., at service-line, departmental, or DRG-level (Da 
Silva Etges et al. 2020; and Keel et al. 2017). This has advantages for providing accurate and 
transparent data for decision-making at the provider level, as well as for price-setting objectives at 
the policymaker level. 
120 As many countries have the objective of regulating pricing for DRGs, there is a need for more 
accurate costing information, necessitating the development of costing systems that produce 
accurate costs (Mercier and Naro, 2014). Since costing systems influence the identification and 
development of DRGs (Chapman, Kern, and Laguecir, 2014), with more accurate data could 
revolutionize health care economics (Kaplan and Porter 2011). Whereas much of the academic 
125 literature and many textbooks suggest that cost systems are either traditional-volume based, ABC 

































































or TDABC, recent research shows that in practice, many costing systems are mixtures (Chapman 
et al., 2013; and Mohr 2017), also referred to as hybrid costing systems (Mohr, 2017).
Managerial relevance of cost information at the provider level 
Managerial relevance relates to whether cost information is considered useful for the provider 
130 level’s management process. An empirical study across 277 US hospitals showed that the more 
detailed cost objects are provided for the cost analysis, the more useful this appears for managers 
(Pizzini, 2006). Next to detail, the study suggests that relevance was linked to a better classification 
of costs according to behaviour and a more frequent reporting of cost information for managers. 
This would suggest that frequent reporting based on ABC or TDABC are judged more relevant as 
135 those methods provide more detailed cost information related to cost behaviour.
 Pizzini finds that more detailed cost information leads to reduced administrative costs and 
increased revenue per bed (2006). In the same vein, Ittner, Lanen, and Larcker (2002) show an 
association between cost system design and successful performance management. The study’s 
empirical data are based on a cross-sectional sample of manufacturing plants. This shows that ABC 
140 alone does not then bring about cost reductions. Instead, cost system design is indirectly linked to 
cost management requiring processes to be in place at operational levels managing cycle time, 
quality, and cost.
Similar results were found in the healthcare sector. Campanale, Cinquini, and Tenucci (2014) study 
the potentialities of TDABC in supporting “transparency” and “resource allocation” in public 
145 hospitals. In an interventionist research approach, they analyze TDABC implementation in an 
Italian hospital. They find that TDABC enhances transparency and supports decisions 
contributing to a better work organization and informed resource allocation. A recent review of 
26 articles on TDABC in surgical contexts confirms that TDABC supports clinicians and managers 
in decision-making (Da Silva Etges et al. 2020). In the same vein, a case study by Eldenbourg et 

































































150 al. (2010) examines the physician’s response to the implementation of an ABC that was developed 
and designed with physician input. They show that managerial relevance leads physicians to change 
their resource utilization patterns for patients’ treatment and that managerial relevance seems to 
be associated with hospitals’ profitability (Eldenburg et al., 2010). 
The most valuable cost data for clinicians are data at the patient-level. At the patient level, cost 
155 data can be linked to patient health outcome data, making the link with value-based healthcare 
creation more apparent. Porter argues that cost data are most relevant at the patient level as they 
can be related to value (2010). He defines value as patient health outcomes achieved relative to the 
costs of care. Kaplan and Porter contend that providers should focus on individual patients’ costs 
over their full cycle of care (2011), rather than just single hospital stays or cost analysis at the 
160 specialty or service department level. It is patient-level costing over the full cycle and across 
different providers that must be matched with health outcomes (Kaplan and Porter, 2011). These 
are the data that would be arguably most relevant for clinical and managerial decision-making.
However, cost data’s relevance depends not only on the cost system design. As healthcare is a 
quite regulated sector in many countries, the regulatory framework influences costs’ relevance. 
165 Political agendas and purposes may, thus, interfere with managerial relevance (Flury and Schedler, 
2006). In particular, New Public Management (NPM) as a political agenda has tried to prioritize 
costing and other managerial tools for decision-makers in the healthcare sector (e.g., Kurunmäki 
and Miller, 2006), making it relevant for day-to-day management. Apart from institutional 
pressures, administrative traditions may play an essential role in the relevance of cost data. 
170 Kurunmäki (2004) points out that administrative traditions in different countries can influence 
cost data use. With no institutional presence of a professional body for management accounting 
in Finland, doctors adopted cost accounting techniques to manage healthcare services. They readily 
recognized the relevance of cost data for managing clinical services.

































































In contrast, early research in the U.K. has highlighted the potential for conflict between the 
175 financial and clinical professions. Even with NPM on top of the agenda, medical professionals 
resisted accounting practices’ intrusion into the medical domain (Kurunmäki, 2004). The 
professional body of management accountants being strongly developed in the U.K., doctors 
opposed the adoption of management accounting techniques within their professional medical 
field. Similarly, Ferlie and Fisher (2013) offer further evidence of clinicians in the U.K. resisting 
180 management accounting. To remedy this, patient-level-information and costing systems (PLICS), 
integrating financial and clinical information at the patient level, have been introduced to better 
align financial and clinical perspectives. PLICS is thought to gradually replace the top-down 
reference costs. To support the development of PLICS, the Healthcare Costing for Value Institute 
was founded by the HFMA, to develop methods to drive value-based healthcare, meaning 
185 “maximizing the outcomes at the lowest possible costs” (HFMA, 2020).
While in six of the observed countries costing guidance was managed over time by the same 
institution, we observe changing responsibilities in England, with various roles at different points 
played by the Department of Health, the Healthcare Financial Management Association, and 
Monitor which was subsequently evolved into NHS Improvement.
190 Thus, administrative traditions in a jurisdiction heavily influence how cost data or other 
management accounting techniques are used and considered relevant to decision-makers. Mohr et 
al. (2020) reinforce this analysis when comparing cost accounting across 19 European countries. 
They underline how NPM is a major driver of government cost accounting, but the government’s 
administrative traditions also influence the use of cost accounting and, therefore, its relevance. 
195 Finally, variations of relevance in terms of cost data can be found across space and time. For 
instance, Laguecir, Chapman, and Kern (2020), studying the case of a social housing firm in France, 
show how different public sector regimes in France influence the understanding of costs and their 
use. 

































































Standardization of cost information across provider organizations
200 Cost accounting data in healthcare is used at the provider level and informs decision-making at 
policy and, therefore, at regional and national levels. The primary purpose for using cost data is 
price-setting for DRGs at the governmental level. However, costing is not subject to mandatory 
adherence to standards as in financial accounting; costing practices vary between different provider 
organizations, not only between countries but within the same country. Such variation creates 
205 problems at the policy level (Northcott and Llewellyn, 2004; and Malcomson, 2007). Cost variation 
is a significant obstacle for fair prices, as prices are supposed to reflect resource consumption. 
Malcomson (2007) identifies four reasons for cost variations among providers: providers’ inherent 
cost characteristics; economies of scale; case-mix; and management practices. Inherent cost 
characteristics are, for example, differences in land costs among providers. Economies of scale are 
210 achieved by the volume of patients treated; smaller units have higher costs per case due to lower 
volume. Differences in case-mix, such as the proportion of patients treated as day cases instead of 
in-patients, also cause variations in costs. Management practices affect the efficiency of services, 
which may vary and lead to cost differences. 
Not mentioned by Malcomson (2007) is the fifth cause of variation, namely: differences in costing 
215 methodologies. As explained in the previous section on accuracy, the choice of ABC or traditional 
volume-based costing or a specific mix of both costing methodologies leads to differences in costs 
at the cost object’s level, i.e., the patient. Different definitions of costs may also cause variations, 
e.g., ward administration, a central administrative cost or operational administrative cost, and a 
different healthcare organization structure itself (Himmelstein et al., 2014). A rece t study on the 
220 quality of cost data across Danish hospitals observes variations of definitions of costs and 
differences in allocation methods at the department level between hospitals (Malmmose and 
Lydersen, 2020). Furthermore, the study finds a melding of both overhead and indirect costs with 
direct costs at the department level. Interestingly the study points out that often aggregate 

































































information is not tied to patient information, thereby not respecting national guidelines 
225 (Malmmose and Lydersen, 2020) and, thus, being decoupled from the policy level (Kern, Lacuecir 
and Leca, 2018)
This is an obstacle for tariff setting purposes at the policy level which requires standardization of 
costing data and costing practices across provider organizations (Busse et al., 2013). Without 
standardization costs for different procedures, the tariff does not convey meaningful information 
230 and cannot be used to identify inefficiencies.
Tan et al. (2014) have analyzed European countries’ cost accounting systems within the Euro DRG 
project. They find that costing systems vary widely in the share of hospital costs reimbursed 
through DRG payment, the presence of mandatory cost accounting and/or costing guidelines, the 
share of cost collecting hospitals, costing methods, and data checks on reported cost data. They 
235 argue that each of these aspects entails a trade-off between the accuracy of the system’s cost data 
and feasibility constraints. More specifically, they identify three trade-offs.
The first trade-off concerns the share of hospital costs reimbursed through DRG payment. A large 
share increases the relative importance of any DRG system and the comprehensiveness of the cost 
database. However, it may jeopardize hospital service delivery’s primary objectives, such as by 
240 prioritizing efficiency over the quality of healthcare services. The second trade-off concerns the 
share of cost collecting hospitals (Tan et al, 2014). A small number of costs collecting hospitals 
with standardized cost accounting systems will lead to a higher quality of cost data. A large number 
of cost collecting hospitals may provide a more comprehensive picture of differences in the 
severity of cases or hospitals’ structure in a particular country during the calculations. However, 
245 costing may lack standardization and, therefore, quality. The last trade-off relates to costing 
methods, such as bottom-up versus top-down micro-costing (Tan et al. 2009; 2014). Tan et al. 
(2014) argue that a bottom-up microcosting approach across providers may be the only way to 
truly measure, compare, and improve the efficiency of hospital service delivery.

































































Analyzing approaches to clinical costing in seven countries 
250 To develop their understanding of these issues, the research team undertook a structured 
collection of data regarding healthcare costing guidance for acute care in seven countries 
(Denmark, England, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal). The countries 
were selected to represent typical characteristics of western European healthcare systems. The 
sample comprises countries with social insurance systems such as France, Germany, and the 
255 Netherlands, and tax-based NHS systems such as Denmark, Portugal, England, and Ireland. 
The researchers collected data via a jointly developed questionnaire on costing guidance. For this 
purpose, researchers gathered the official costing guidance for their jurisdiction (Table 1) and 
relevant secondary documents. Also, interviews with regulators, guidance setters, and costing 
experts were carried out for specific questions. An initial data collection took place in 2012 and 
260 the collected data was updated at the end of 2020.
Insert Table 1 here
The questionnaire was developed around two independent aspects of costing approaches that 
265 affect quality: 1) the purposes of costing systems and their integration with the regulatory 
framework, and 2) the costing method adopted. A challenge in undertaking this analysis is that the 
vocabulary and concepts around costing guidance are often only partially defined, particularly in 
terms of the costing method. This complicates international comparisons of costing guidance. For 
instance, the labels used to characterize costing guidance or costing systems (e.g., a top-down 
270 costing system) are often not precisely defined. 

































































To address this issue in our study, in the glossary section (please see Table 6 cost concepts glossary) 
we define the main concepts around costing guidance used in this report and data collection. This 
study's specific definitions are drawn from the DRG and costing system’s conceptual framework 
as defined in the relevant literature (Chapman and Kern, 2010; and Busse et al, 2011).
275 The data analysis was initially carried out by a single researcher to ensure consistency, and this was 
subsequently checked by the others. The preliminary results were presented and discussed at a 
workshop organized in November 2012, attended by the entire network and a range of U.K. 
healthcare costing practitioners and regulators. The results were published in a report to 
policymakers (Chapman et al., 2013).
280


































































Purposes of costing systems and their integration with the regulatory framework
In most countries, costing information that is produced based on costing guidance is used for 
three main officially stated purposes: 1) internally at the provider level to produce cost reports; 2) 
285 to inform prices at national levels; and 3) as a benchmark, not only within the provider 
organization, but with other providers. Table 2 gives an overview of the purposes of costing across 
the seven countries.
Insert Table 2 here
290
In most countries, the purpose of clinical costing is closely linked to the development and updating 
of the DRG-based payment systems. In all countries, cost information is used to calculate or adjust 
DRG weights, and several countries also use cost information for the development and refinement 
of DRGs. (Please see the last column in Table 2.)
295 Due to the purpose of informing DRG-based payment systems, regulators seek to decrease 
variation in costing practices across providers to make costs more comparable. An essential tool 
used by regulators to achieve this is mandatory costing guidelines. The mandatory costing 
guidelines (edited by regulators and government), shape cost system design at the provider level. 
This external influence on cost system design is a specific characteristic of the healthcare sector. 
300 Across most countries, the development of costing guidance was driven by the introduction of the 
funding system. Governments’ interest in a fair funding system is often a dominant motivation for 
introducing costing guidance. Nonetheless, the managerial relevance of costing can conflict with 
tariff setting and related standardization, leading to trade-offs between these purposes.

































































The seven countries have different approaches regarding the number of providers applying cost 
305 guidance (see Table 3). In some countries (Denmark and France), all providers have to adhere to 
the costing guidance, and the cost information of all providers is collected (Denmark and France). 
In other countries (e.g., Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), not all providers adhere to the 
same guidance. In England, all providers have to adhere to HRG-form costing (HRG are the UK 
DRGs), with PLICS now mandatory in the acute sector with plans to make it mandatory more 
310 widely. Cost information from only a sample of them is collected and informs the tariff calculation. 
These providers must follow the patient level costing guidance, and their compliance is verified. 
The sampling approach is driven by economic criteria or left to the site’s discretion. For example, 
in France, all sites have to conform to unique costing guidance, but each hospital can choose 
whether or not to be part of the sampling informing the tariffs.
315 When the number of providers is relatively high, as in Germany, sampling can decrease the cost 
calculation process’s overall costs. The cost associated with the control of guidance compliance is 
also lower. 
In all countries following the sampling approach, participation in the sample is voluntary. 
Therefore, the sample representativeness cannot be ensured. The regulator can only reject a 
320 volunteering organization wishing to participate in the sample. Providers with relatively low 
average costs across the board may also not participate in the sample so as not to drive down the 
DRG weight and benefit in this way from a relatively high tariff. In terms of sample size, 
approaches vary widely across countries. 
325 Insert Table 3 here

































































The relationship between the costing system and the regulatory framework differs across 
countries. In some countries, such as England, only high-level accounts of the chart of accounts 
are mandatory. The detailed accounts used in hospitals may then differ from one hospital to 
330 another. Although recently some attention has been given to how to introduce more 
standardisation to the relationship between the general and costing ledgers.
In other countries, e.g., Germany and France, a detailed chart of accounts is mandatory to 
ensure that all hospitals use the same accounts. This detailed chart of accounts can then be used 
to define the costing guidance (see Table 4). 
335
Insert Table 4 here
In these latter cases, the mandatory detailed chart of accounts serves and facilitates the 
standardization of costing. DRG systems also impact costing as they determine the precise cost 
340 information required, thereby influencing the types of cost, cost pools, and cost drivers. In turn, 
the analysis of cost information is the basis for the refinement of DRG systems. 
Costing method adopted
A costing method is characterized mainly by the nature of the cost object, the way costs of 
a cost object are aggregated or disaggregated, top-down or bottom-up, and the treatment of the 
345 indirect costs, i.e., activity or volume-based. The cost objects supported by costing guidance 
include the DRGs, the specialty/service-line, and the patient. These cost objects are linked to 
different levels of enforcement (see Table 5). Patient-level costing guidance is mandatory in three 
countries: Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, at least for a sample of hospitals. Ireland is 
running a pilot study on patient-level costing at some 15 pilot sites. 

































































350 Some countries employ specific costing guidance in place for different cost objects. For 
example, two countries (England and Ireland) have DRG level costing and have started 
implementing optional patient-level costing. In England meanwhile patient-level costing has 
become mandatory for the acute sector and it is planned to become the norm for all sectors.
This move is motivated by the expectation of obtaining more accurate cost information and 
355 making costs more manageable. These two countries have two pieces of guidance in place, i.e., 
costing guidance for mandatory DRG and specialty-level costing, and costing guidance for patient-
level costing. The existence of two sets of guidance is also observed in sampling systems. For 
example, in Germany, there is a mandatory cost centre level costing for all providers and a 
mandatory patient-level costing for providers of the sample informing the DRG costing. 
360
Insert Table 5 here
Concerning the aggregation and disaggregation of costs and the treatment of indirect costs, 
we find that, in general, the costing guidance is a mixture of different methods. For example, the 
365 German patient-level guidance offers two options for the treatment of costs of executive 
management. One option suggests that executive management costs (indirect costs) should be 
attributed to direct (patient-related) cost centres based on the primary direct costs. This 
corresponds to a top-down volume-based costing. The other option states that these costs should 
be attributed to direct cost centres based on the number of full-time employees, which is also top-
370 down volume-based costing. The volume here does not refer to the number of units produced, 
but rather to production resources. However, for other indirect costs, e.g., the operating theatre, 
the German guidance proposes bottom-up activity-based costing. Costs in the operating theatre 
are calculated based on theatre minutes, considering re-tooling and labor intensity (the hours 

































































worked by staff for the operation). Therefore, costing guidance and costing systems at the provider 
375 level consist of a mix of methods, i.e., top-down/bottom-up and volume/activity-based costing.
Relating findings to analysis of dimensions of quality from the literature
This study answers recent calls on studying the interaction between regulation and costing 
(Chapman, Kern, and Laguecir, 2014; Eldenburg, Krishnan and Krishnan, 2017; and Labro and 
Stice-Lawrence, 2020) with a specific focus on the quality of costing information (Hrifach et al., 
380 2018). In seeking to analyze regulatory approaches to costing across seven countries, we developed 
a framework for analysis in terms of: 1) the purposes of costing systems and their integration with 
the regulatory framework; and 2) the costing method adopted. Building upon differences between 
countries reported in our results, this section discusses how this impact the quality of cost 
information.
385 The tariff setting purpose is dominant at the regulatory level, requiring standardization. As 
underlined by several studies (Malmmose and Lydersen, 2020; Audit Commission, 2012, and Vogl, 
2013, 2012), such standardization of costing is difficult in practice for regulators to achieve due to 
the high costs of implementing standards and collecting and auditing cost information. Moreover, 
there are difficulties observed in implementing guidelines at the provider level. These difficulties 
390 go so far as costing practices in hospitals being decoupled from national guidelines (Malmmose 
and Lydersen, 2020; and Kern, Laguecir and Leca, 2018).
Standardization may also stand in the way of making costing relevant for decision-making at the 
clinical unit level, another important objective for policymakers. Using costs for management 
requires costing to have managerial relevance and, therefore, to be specific to frontline staff’s 
395 needs. There is currently little guidance for providers on making cost information relevant to 
management at the clinical unit level. Exceptions are England (NSI, 2020) and France (MeaH 
2009, ANAP 2015, ATIH 2019). NHS Improvement following the early lead of HFMA has led a 

































































major overhaul of costing during the period, with a costing transformation programme aimed at 
furthering the relevance of costing for Managerial decision making.
400 To this we can add to Vogl (2012), who points out that, while bottom-up costing in Germany 
increases the quality at the managerial level, there is still a problem in the quality of the data for 
tariff setting due to the composition of the sample. In fact, we identify a trade-off between two 
dimensions of quality of costing, i.e., standardization and managerial relevance. Integrating both 
of these purposes at the regulatory level within costing guidance would support the managerial 
405 relevance of cost information at the clinical unit level where key-decision-making takes place. 
Producing cost information for both purposes may require two cost systems at the provider level: 
one serving standardization and the other serving managerial relevance. The French case, where 
the cost information produced for standardization is proposed at the same time as support for 
hospital managers, is illustrative of the two-in-one approach.
410 Equally, the quality of costing could be managed by integrating costing and the chart of accounts 
to enhance accuracy and standardization. Firstly, this integration supports management 
accountants at the provider level when designing cost systems, as it eases the reconciliation of cost 
information and the general ledger, thus improving the accuracy of cost information at the 
provider level. Secondly, this integration supports standardization of costing practices and, 
415 therefore, cost data use at national levels. If there is no mandated detailed chart of accounts, costing 
guidance leaves room for variation in linking specific accounts with the cost pool structure. 
However, such a standardization of the chart of accounts may compromise the managerial 
relevancy of the accounts at the provider level. Thus, leading to another trade-off between 
standardization and managerial relevance.
420 Furthermore, the quality of costing can be managed by introducing sampling, meaning rather than 
taking cost data from all providers into account, selecting a sample of hospitals that will provide 
cost data for tariff setting purposes. Sampling supports the standardization of cost information. 

































































Nevertheless, while sampling also reduces the costs of producing cost information and controlling 
its quality, it raises the issue of providers’ representativeness. Some of the characteristics that may 
425 influence the sample’s representativeness are the number of public and private providers and small 
and big providers. Being a public or private hospital may influence the cost structure, while the 
hospital’s size has an economic influence in terms of economies of scale and scope. This has led 
some countries, like France, to develop two separate samples and tariff grids: public and non-profit 
hospitals; and private for-profit hospitals.
430 As these characteristics influence the costs of a provider, they affect the reported costs of the 
sample. For example, providers with relatively low costs may not participate in the sample so as 
not to decrease the tariff and profit from a relatively higher tariff. Therefore, sampling may not 
necessarily improve the quality of cost data at the national level, i.e., the tariff’s quality, if the sample 
does not accurately represent hospitals’ mix in the total sample. Consequently, the trade-off to 
435 consider here is that between standardization and accuracy of costs. 
Costing quality can also be managed by introducing specific costing methods, which may impact 
all dimensions of costing quality, i.e. accuracy, relevance at the provider level and standardization 
at the regulatory level. The costing methods set out in the national guidelines vary greatly across 
the seven countries. While always consisting of a mix of both bottom-up and top-down and 
440 volume and activity-based methods, the guidance differ in how the methods are mixed.
Firstly, costing methods impact accuracy. Regarding accuracy, bottom-up costing allows 
accounting for more accurate costs at the patient level. Top-down costing, which is based on 
averages, is faster and more easily implemented but produces less accurate cost information at the 
patient level (Porter and Kaplan, 2011). Volume-based costing entails another disadvantage in 
445 terms of accuracy: changes in volume in one unit can potentially impact other units. In contrast, 
activity-based costing, establishing cause-and-effect relationships between indirect costs and 

































































activities, can avoid this source of variation, allowing costs of unused capacity to be directly 
analyzed. 
Secondly, costing methods impact managerial relevance. Bottom-up costing produces cost 
450 information that varies across patients, which can then be more easily linked with clinical outcomes 
and, therefore, serve to calculate the value produced, making such information particularly relevant 
for clinical decision-making (Porter and Kaplan, 2011). Bottom-up is also more flexible as it more 
easily allows for the introduction of new cost objects (e.g., patient trajectory). Top-down costing, 
relying on averages, makes it difficult to relate clinical outcomes and costs meaningfully at the 
455 patient level and is, consequently, less relevant for decision-making at the provider level. 
Thirdly, costing methods impact standardization. Standardizing bottom-up costing across 
providers is resource-intensive, while it is faster and more easily achieved with top-down costing. 
Yet the impacts of efficiency driven through tariff grids do not take quality issues into account and 
should be further investigated. France would provide a good basis for this with its top-down 
460 method designed for standardization purposes and putting strong pressure on clinical teams to 
increase activity volumes with some adverse side effects on quality and professional, ethical trade-
offs (Angelé-Halgand and Garrot, 2014).
To sum up we, observe that the choice of costing methods impacts all three dimensions of the 
quality of costing, entailing trade-offs between accuracy, managerial relevance at the provider level 
465 and standardization. Here we contribute to the discussion on trade-offs regarding cost information 
quality (Tan et al., 2014). Tan et al. (2014) identify trade-offs between the accuracy of cost data 
and feasibility constraints. We propose that accuracy is only one dimension of the quality of cost 
information, the other two dimensions being managerial relevance at the provider level and 
standardization across provider organizations. We then suggest, in contrast to Tan et al. (2014), 
470 that there are trade-offs within these three dimensions of quality of cost data, that is, between 
accuracy, managerial relevance, and standardization. 

































































Here, our study complements that of Tan et al. (2014) by re-defining cost vocabulary. The 
categories of cost allocation methods underlying the Tan et al. (2014) study, i.e., the categories of 
bottom-up microcosting, top-down microcosting, bottom-up gross costing, and top-down gross 
475 costing are, in our view, imprecise and potentially misleading. As outlined in Table 6 definitions 
for cost vocabulary, we suggest distinguishing between bottom-up and top-down costing, and 
noting that costing systems are often a mixture of both methods (Chapman et al., 2013, 2016). We 
reinforce the findings of Chapman, Kern, Laguecir, and Quentin (2016) and Mohr (2013, 2017), 
suggesting that we often find mixtures of both methods and therefore hybrid costing systems in 
480 practice.
Conclusion
Policymakers need to manage the complex trade-offs between the different dimensions of cost 
quality, i.e., accuracy, managerial relevance at the provider level, and standardization. To do so, the 
various rules, guidances, and systems influencing costing must be carefully integrated. Costing 
485 guidance, the DRG system, and financial accounting are often under the responsibility of different 
instructional actors, making it difficult to consider their inter-dependence. A potential step for 
managing the quality of clinical costing would be integration at the institutional level. An integrated 
approach to costing guidance and patient classification systems may allow for better coordination 
of both elements’ development, and enable potential synergies to be realized, both at 
490 organizational and technical levels. Therefore, policymakers might integrate costing guidance and 
DRG systems, as for example in Germany within InEK.1 However, integration may also be 
1Taking integration to its logical conclusion, Germany created a single actor responsible for the main elements of the 
hospital payment system, including clinical costing. Germany is a jurisdiction with a universal multi-payer healthcare 
system, marked by public and private insurance, public and private providers, and different regional and national 
budgets. Yet all players agreed to create a new organization in 2001 (InEK) that would be responsible for developing 
the hospital payment system, defining and updating bottom-up patient level costing guidance. The responsibility for 
the development of patient classification systems and costing guidance falls here under the same umbrella.

































































achieved by considering the interdependencies between costing guidance, DRG systems, and 
financial reporting, without necessarily creating a single organization.
Whether or not they are integrated in a single organization, due to the various trade-offs we have 
495 identified, policymakers can not follow through on all dimensions of quality of costs 
simultaneously. Instead, they must make choices entailing compromises. Providers may be at 
different stages in their costing process. Some have implemented ABC costing for a large part of 
their indirect costs, while others are just starting to implement Patient Level Information and 
Costing Systems (PLICS), and not yet at the stage of exploiting their cost data in decision making.
500 This impacts the objectives at the regulators’ level of standardization for tariff setting and sampling. 
We argue here that it is not only standardization that can make costing more transparent in such a 
context. Instead, regulators, policymakers, and practitioners at the provider level alike could benefit 
from more transparency regarding where exactly the hospitals stand. To this end, hospitals could 
calculate the part of indirect costs that are handled with activity-based drivers and the part of costs 
505 handled with volume-based costing, as done with the MAQS in England (HFMA, 2013).
MAQS calculates the proportion of costs calculated with activity-based and traditional volume-
based costing setting out a series of cost pools. The score is derived by quality weighting the 
quantum of cost in each cost pool according to the cost driver’s appropriateness (HFMA 2013). 
Whilst this focuses attention on the detail of costing simply and intuitively, the tool directs 
510 attention to cost drivers and not so much cost pool structure, however, although this is an 
important aspect of achieving a true cause and effect relationship in cost analysis. For example, 
clinical staff costs might in principle be more accurately traced using patient minutes. However, if 
the costs of different categories of staff performing different activities are aggregated into one 
large cost pool, then dividing by patient minutes produces a less accurate cost for a cost object 
515 than if staff cost is broken down into sub cost pools and separate patient minute rates calculated.

































































In this respect, an interesting evolution is that MAQS is to adopt a two-dimensional (mapping 
resource costs into activity costs) matrix structure to frame analysis of cost driver options (as also 
discussed in Chapman, Kern, Laguecir and Quentin, 2016). This evolution of MAQS would enable 
detailed discussion of the trade-offs between dimensions of cost quality since decisions about 
520 whether a particular intersection of resource and activity costs is either financially and/or clinically 
material can inform decisions about the benefits of investing in more detailed and precise cost 
drivers. At the provider level, conversations around these matters can act to drive targeted local 
improvements to costing systems where they can generate specific benefits. At the policy level, 
regulators can use the profile of quality weights to focus collective attention on particular areas 
525 and allow for different levels of preparedness of individual providers to move towards higher 
quality costing systems.
Regulators could also use a 2D MAQS to manage the many trade-offs between quality and cost of 
costing underlying the decision to impose tariffs based on only a small sample of providers in some 
countries. Germany, for example, samples a small proportion of providers and has extremely high-
530 quality demands. The providers not included in the sample may have a wide range of quality of 
costing and, absent a regulatory requirement, might be missing out on the possibilities for service 
improvement a costing system might offer. A 2D MAQS approach would allow regulators to direct 
the attention of all providers towards the benefits of costing information whilst also allowing for 
the prioritization of accuracy in costs informing tariffs. Whilst making a requirement for a return 
535 of cost data from all providers, a hurdle level of quality to qualify for inclusion in the tariff setting 
sample might be set. Given that the tool also promises to drive local quality improvements in cost 
systems and service delivery, this would offer the potential for the sample making up the tariff to 
grow over time as more and more providers reached the threshold.
Finally, for practitioners in hospitals and policymakers and regulators at national levels, it would 
540 be interesting to know the proportion of costs calculated after one or the other methods to 

































































enhance the value and reliability of international comparisons of cost data (Himmelstein et al., 
2014).
We conclude with a reminder that more research on these matters is needed and that our findings 
must be interpreted with caution. This study’s focus was acute care, and broader clinical practice 
545 (e.g., mental health) may impact the results as costs in these areas are less standardizable. Naturally, 
we also have to be cautious regarding how far our results can be generalized, as the number of 
countries examined is limited to seven. Finally, the study dealt with guidance, which may differ 
from the provider level’s actual costing practices. However, as the ultimate usefulness of costing 
guidance is determined by its use at the provider level, this should be a focus of future research.
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We would like to thank you very much for your constructive comments. We carefully considered 
them in the revision of the paper. Our responses are indicated below in italics.
1) Section literature review: please verify the possibility to include more recent literature 
Thank you for pointing this issue out. In the new version, we added recent literature to the introduction and the 
theory section. In particular, we refer to the following more recent papers: Hrifach et al., 2018; Mercier and Naro, 
2014; Silva Etges et al., 2020; Labro and Stice-Lawrence, 2020; Eldenburg, Krishnan, and Krishnan, 
2017; De Araujo et al., 2019.
2) Section Method: I feel difficulties in getting the link between data collected and the 
dimensions of quality. It would be beneficial with respect to the clarity of the paper to 
provide a clear connection between sources of data (or questions/group of questions of 
the questionnaires) and the three dimensions of quality discussed in the paper.
3) Section Presentation of findings: The presentation of result is a characterisation and 
comparison of the different approaches to clinical costing across 7 jurisdictions. I still 
find difficulties in capturing the link of the presented findings with the dimensions of 
quality of cost information, as well as to get the key points that would be object of 
discussion later in the paper 
4) Discussion: 
a. The Discussion has improved but it still needs further elaboration. In fact, I still have 
difficulties in seeing the connection with empirical findings. In particular, how have you 
been able to discuss the dimensions of quality with evidences presented in your results (in 
the current version results characterise and compare different approaches to clinical 
costing across 7 jurisdictions) . 
b. Another difficult is getting the dimension of relevance within your empirical data. 
c. Recommendations do not follow a presentation of best practices, as I would have 
expected (the concept of best practices needs also explanations, as stated above). 
d. As well as for the section “Result”, this section needs major connection with your 
framework of analysis of quality 
e. You discuss a trade-off among the three dimensions of quality. Examples of trade-off 
are presented around the section.  This discussion would benefit if you are able to present 
trade-off more systematically. 
Thank you for these very helpful comments. We carefully considered and addressed them in the new version. We 
improved the link between empirics and the rest of the paper. To achieve this undertook the following changes:
 We rewrote the abstract.
 We rewrote the introduction, the literature review, the discussion, and the conclusion to align them better 
while improving the link between the empirical analysis and the dimensions of quality of costing.
 We also changed the headings and subtitles of the different sections to reflect better the link between 
empirics and the rest of the paper.
We also carried out the following minor changes:
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 we moved the glossary box to the appendix
 we had the text copy edited
Other major points: 
1) Pag. 5 line 135-140: You say that ABC and TDABC may provide more relevant information. 
Although I agree with this claim, traditional methods when providing detailed and personalized 
information may as well support relevance. 
2) Pag. 6 : You introduce the concept of outcome. It would be interesting to see a brief 
discussion about this key point in your conclusion. 
3) Pag. 6-7: You introduce the discussion about relevance. However the researches you mention 
do not properly deal with relevance, but they deal with the use/acceptance of managerial tools by 
physicians and their managerialization/hybridization. Make sure to provide a sufficient discussion 
about relevance, when mentioning this research. For example, the work by Kurunmaki (2004) 
discusses the hybridization of medical professions and how the approach to reforms may impact 
on this phenomena, but she does not discuss relevance. 
4) Pag. 18 from line 53: You say that standardization can support relevance. Can you provide 
better argument for this claim? 
Later you argue exactly the opposite, i.e. that standardization limits relevance. Can you provide 
argumentation for this apparent contradiction? 
5) In general, many claims declared are presented in a too much simplistic way and would need a 
better argumentation 
Finally, we addressed all the above-mentioned points.
We hope that with the new version, we now address your comments.
Thank you again for your constructive comments.
Best regards, 
The authors
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Countries Costing guidance Institution for costing 
guidance
Institution for DRG
Denmark Kogebog (Cookbook) and Taktssystem 
2012
The Danish Ministry of 
Health (Ministeriet for 
Sundhed of Forebyggelse)
DRG office at the 
National Board of 
Health




National Health Service 
Improvement
National Health Service 
Information Authority



























Institut für das 
Entgeltsystem im 
Krankenhaus (InEK)
Institut für das 
Entgeltsystem im 
Krankenhaus (InEK)
Ireland Activity Based Funding 2019 Admitted 
Patient Price List (www.hpo.ie)
Health Pricing Office Health Pricing Office
Netherlands Kostprijsmodel zorgproducten medisch 
specialistische zorg. Utrecht: Nederlandse 
Zorgautoriteit. 2012




Portugal Plano Oficial Contabilidade Ministério da 
Saúde – Official Accounts Plan 
Ministry of Health Central Administration 
of the Health System 
(ACSS) (under the 
authority of the Ministry 
of Health)
Table 1: Costing Guidance and Institutions 


















































































Regional transfer prices & 
assessing private hospital 
costs 
England X X X Development of DRG system
France X X X Development of DRG system
Germany X X X X Development of DRG system
Ireland X X X
Ad hoc data requests (e.g. 
HSE/DOH, FOI) & research
Netherland
s X X X X
Economic evaluations & 
academic research
Portugal X X
Economic evaluations & 
academic research
Table 2: Purposes of clinical costing
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Sample number of 
hospitals (in.%) Total number of hospitals Selection criteria
Denmark 44 (100%) 44 N/A
England  392 (100%)  392 N/A
France 143 in 20201 (7.6%) 1894 in 20192
Acceptance of a supervisor, use of a 
software designed for NSC, transfer of 
data with a specific methodology
Germany 282 (19.5%) 1447
Voluntary participation; 40 hospitals 
were sampled in 2016 based on hospital 
ownership and DRG services, and were 
obliged to submit cost data for five 
years to increase data 
representativeness 
Ireland 39 (67.5%) 58 >2,000 discharges
Netherlands 13-23 94
Voluntary participation, different 
samples per type of hospital 
Portugal
All NHS hospitals 
(100%) ca. 60 -
Table 3: Sample characteristics of providers contributing cost data for DRG weight calculation
1 Agence Technique de l’Information sur l’Hospitalisation (ATIH), Echantillon ENC MCO – Campagne 2020
2 Agence Technique de l’Information sur l’Hospitalisation (ATIH), Chiffres clés MCO 2019, June 2020


































































Denmark Between accounts and costing 
England Between high-level accounts and costing
France Between detailed accounts and costing
Germany Between detailed accounts and costing
Ireland Between high-level accounts and costing
Netherlands Between detailed accounts and costing 
Portugal Between high-level accounts and costing
Table 4: Link between chart of account and costing
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Main cost objects of cost calculation
Countries DRG Specialty/Service line Patient
Denmark M O M
England M O M/O
France (1) M M O
Germany (1) M M M
Ireland M M N (yes* 15 pilot sites)
Netherlands M M M
Portugal (2) N M M/O
Table 5: Main cost objects of calculation (M=mandatory, O=optional guidance to support, N=not formally 
supported)
(1): Information applies to hospitals that voluntarily participate in the cost information collection sample.
(2): Costs are calculated at the patient level but are not collected at this level.
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Activity-Based Costing (ABC): Activity-Based Costing (ABC) is an approach to attribute indirect costs to cost 
objects. It is an alternative to volume-based attribution of indirect costs to cost objects (i.e., by allocating costs across 
volume). ABC makes cause-and-effect relationships visible by disaggregating indirect costs into the costs of activities 
for which cause-and-effect cost drivers can be established. For example, the finance department’s costs are indirect 
costs, for which no single cost driver offers a clear reflection of cause-and-effect. Activity-Based Costing would break 
this total cost down into resources (e.g. staff, equipment, etc.) that can be traced to activities (e.g., running the payroll, 
credit control) using appropriate cause-and-effect cost drivers which can be found to allocate the costs. NB: ABC can 
be based on top-down or a bottom-up costing (see Time-Driven ABC).
Bottom-up costing: Bottom-up costing refers to the methodological choice to aggregate up the cost of the chosen 
cost object from units of resource cost analyzed at a lower level of aggregation. For example, if total operating theatre 
costs are divided out across total patient minutes, this cost per minute can then be aggregated up to individual patients. 
NB: the choice of bottom-up/top-down is independent of other methodological choices such as volume/activity-
based analysis of cost behaviour. In practice, pure forms of any of these choices are rare.
Cause-and-effect relationships: The essence of a costing system, whether top-down or bottom-up, activity or 
volume-based, is establishing cause-and-effect relationships between costs and the cost object. Cause-and-effect 
relationships make costs transparent and manageable.
Chart of accounts: The financial accounting system is linked to costing through the chart of accounts. This chart 
prescribes the accounts to be used in the book-keeping system, defining how cost information is initially recorded. 
The detail and structure of the accounts then influence the structure of cost centres and pools.
Cost object: A cost object is an item such as a product, service, department, doctor, patient, or group of patients for 
which costs are calculated.
Cost centre: A unit of an organization, for which its manager is responsible for the costs arising in that unit. In 
hospitals, these often correspond to clinical departments.
Cost drivers: The factors that most closely influence the costs of an activity or a certain kind of cost in relation to a 
cost object.
Costing method: The costing method defines how costs are calculated. The most common methods of calculating 
costs are: 1) the definition of the main cost objects (e.g., patient-, DRG- or specialty- level); 2) the disaggregation or 
aggregation of costs (i.e., top-down or bottom-up costing); and 3) the attribution of indirect costs to cost objects (i.e., 
volume or activity-based). Costing guidance may define different cost objects. They usually also consist of a mix of 
ways to attribute indirect costs to cost objects (volume and activity-based) and a mix of aggregating and disaggregating 
costs (top-down and bottom-up costing).
Cost pool: All service costs (including direct, indirect, and overhead costs) are grouped into cost pool groups (e.g., 
electricity, physicians’ costs, costs of nurses, costs of medication) to enable analysis. An activity-based approach to 
cost pools facilitates establishing cause-and-effect relationships (see ABC). 
Costing guidance: Costing guidance is used here to describe any formal support edited at the institutional level, i.e., 
governments, regulators, or policymakers, to support costing at the healthcare provider level. The guidance includes 
standards, rules, recommendations, or other formalizations of procedures. Guidance, in this sense, may be optional 
or mandatory.
Direct cost: In the U.K. healthcare environment, a distinction is made between direct cost, indirect cost, and 
overhead. In terms of cost analysis, however, the central distinction is between costs that may be related through 
cause-and-effect to cost objects (i.e., direct costs) and those which cannot (i.e., all other costs). Outside of the field of 
healthcare, the terms indirect cost and overhead are generally used synonymously.
General ledger: The system of accounting records of transactions relating to a company’s assets, liabilities, owners’ 
equity, revenue, and expenses. 
Sampling: Sampling is the selection of a subset of healthcare providers to estimate the characteristics of all providers. 
Two advantages of sampling are that the cost is lower, and data collection is faster.
Service-line: With service line management, a hospital trust is divided into specialist clinical areas that are then 
managed as distinct operational units led by clinicians.
Costing for a specialty/department: Calculating costs for a specialty service. Could be based on a top-down or 
bottom-up methodology
Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing (TDABC): This costing method is the development of ABC. The original 
ABC was often conceived as a top-down costing approach. TDABC is the bottom-up development of ABC. It requires 
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answering the following two questions: How much does it cost to provide each process’s resource capacity? How 
much resource capacity (time) is required to perform work for each order, product, or service?
Top-down costing: Top-down refers to the methodological choice to disaggregate the cost of the chosen cost object 
from costs analyzed at a higher aggregation level than the cost object. For example, total operating theatre costs might 
be divided out across the total number of patients. N.B. the choice of bottom-up/top-down is independent of other 
methodological choices such as volume/activity-based analysis of cost behaviour. In practice, pure forms of any of 
these choices are rare.
Traditional volume-based costing: Volume-based attribution of indirect costs to cost objects (i.e., allocating costs 
across volume). First, an allocation base, such as the direct costs or a profit centre’s turnover, is chosen. The indirect 
costs are then attributed in proportion to the allocation base. To that end, the cost driver is calculated by dividing the 
total indirect costs for a certain cost category by the chosen allocation base. For example, the cost driver for indirect 
material costs could accordingly be calculated as a total indirect cost for material divided by the total direct material 
costs. The resulting percentage can be added to the direct material costs, e.g., costs for a hip, as indirect material costs, 
e.g., costs for purchasing the hip and storing the hip, at the level of a cost object.
Cost avoidability: ABC enables us to trace costs and to identify those costs that are avoidable. Within traditional 
volume-based costing, costs that are, in principle, direct are often treated as indirect, as it is less costly to capture them 
as indirect costs rather than tracing them to the level of the cost object. This then makes it difficult to identify costs 
that can be avoided.
Table 6: Cost concepts glossary
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